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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the high increased costs of insurance premiums and advances 
in medicine, tort reform has become a rising area of conflict in the law.1  
States are found in conflict with the high costs of insurance while at the same 
time protecting an individual’s rights to seek just compensation in the law.2  
Many legislators have adopted distinct standards in order to respond 
effectively to the needs of their state.3  States, such as Georgia, Arizona, 
North Carolina, and others, are revolutionizing medical malpractice reform 
by increasing the burden of proof required in emergency physicians’ medical 
malpractice cases from the standard torts preponderance of the evidence to a 
clear and convincing standard.4 
Increasing the standard of proof to a clear and convincing standard 
makes it close to impossible for a plaintiff to raise a successful claim against 
a doctor who committed malpractice.5  Nevertheless, tort reform is rapidly 
occurring across the United States; many lobbyists of these reforms promise 
that the restrictions on a plaintiff will bring lower insurance costs for 
everyone.6  Statistical evidence contradicts that promise, with a showing of 
four hundred thousand dollars as the average amount that a jury awards in 
medical malpractice cases.7 
Following the wave of tort reform, Florida has passed caps on the 
amount of damages that can be awarded to a plaintiff and has made the 
distinction between cases of emergency physicians and general 
practitioners.8  With recent cases, such as Estate of McCall v. United States,9 
the constitutionality of tort reform has been called into question when caps 
																																																								
1. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” 
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 457, 517 (2006); Steve Cohen, On Tort Reform, It’s 
Time to Declare Victory and Withdraw, FORBES (Mar. 02, 2015, 9:59 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevecohen/2015/03/02/on-tort-reform-its-time-to-declare-
victory-and-withdraw. 
2. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 438, 441, 446; Cohen, supra note 1. 
3. Sample Legislation, AM. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, 
http://www.acep.org/Content.aspx?id=33178 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
4. Id. 
5. See Cohen, supra note 1. 
6. Cohen, supra note 1; Sample Legislation, supra note 3. 
7. Cohen, supra note 1. 
8. FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2), (4) (2014). 
9. 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014). 
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are applied in wrongful deaths cases but not personal injury.10  If Florida 
chooses to continue tort reform and creates a distinction between medical 
practices, like its sister state Georgia, it would encounter many hurdles in 
establishing a rational basis for the distinct treatment.11  The biggest hurdle 
for tort reformers to overcome is the Florida Constitution because it is unique 
from other states, as it provides equal protection and guarantees its citizens 
access to the courts.12 
Setting aside the issue of whether caps on damages in malpractice 
cases are constitutional under equal protection, this Comment will discuss 
the following question:  Will Florida be able to follow Georgia in its tort 
reform and increase the burden of proof in emergency care cases?13  Part II 
will introduce a brief history of modern tort reform that leads to the issue 
today of targeting tort reforms towards medical malpractice.14  Part III will 
analyze the national modern attempts to encourage tort reform in medical 
malpractice.15  Part IV will discuss Georgia’s reasoning behind an increased 
burden of proof.16  Part V will discuss the individuality of Florida law and 
the change after Estate of McCall.17  Finally, Part VI will conclude with how 
Florida is unable to follow Georgia in its path towards reform.18 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN TORT REFORM 
A. What Is Tort Reform? 
The area of tort law in civil litigation was created to provide justice 
and to compensate those who have been injured due to negligence or with 
purposeful intent.19  The purpose of tort law is to place the victim, who 
suffered a loss, in the same position before the breach of duty.20  Tort law, 
majorly based on common law, imposes legal liability on an individual who 
deviates from the norm and compensates the victim with monetary awards.21  
																																																								
10. Id. at 899. 
11. See id. at 914; Greg Roslund, The Medical Malpractice Rundown:  A 
State-by-State Report Card, EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS MONTHLY (July 21, 2014), 
http://www.epmonthly.com/departments/subspecialties/medico-legal/the-medical-malpractice-
rundown-a-state-by-state-report-card. 
12. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 21; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 933. 
13. See infra Part V. 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. See infra Part III. 
16. See infra Part IV. 
17. See infra Part V. 
18. See infra Part VI. 
19. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2000). 
20. Hubbard, supra note 1, at 440. 
21. DOBBS, supra note 19, at 2. 
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Tort law’s quick adaptation to legislative enactments due to various interests 
from insurance companies, corporations, and legal practitioners makes it a 
dynamic area of law open to criticism.22  Tort reform is often defined as a 
movement that limits the ability and award that a plaintiff can attain when 
pursuing a civil tort lawsuit in order to address a series of crises.23  Tort 
reform often involves distinct actors, such as the American Medical 
Association or State Farm Insurance, with multiple interests but who share a 
common goal for efficiency.24  Other times tort reform is part of a political 
movement, which is subject to economic needs.25 
Critics often debate whether some of these reforms violate 
constitutional principles, such as those of due process, and whether this 
constant adaption to social policies opens the floodgates for courthouses over 
the country with frivolous lawsuits.26  Supporters of tort reform propose 
changes to the judicial system to decrease costs in the economy, as insurance 
premiums rise and medical innovation expands.27  It is frequently deemed as 
a controversial area of law because tort reform often aims at limiting the 
amount of recovery a victim can receive for his or her injury. 28   The 
reasoning behind such limitations is the increase in high insurances, but often 
the effect goes beyond limiting the compensation system and is done at the 
cost of guaranteed constitutional rights.29 
B. Modern Tort Reform in the 1970s 
In order to understand whether states, such as Florida, can adopt 
other states’ standards in medical malpractice cases, it is essential to give a 
brief historical introduction to important tort reforms that have lead to the 
common practice today.30  While tort law is considered common law and was 
introduced in the United States as early as the 1800s, the true identity of 
reform began in the 1970s when the insurance market quickly rose.31  As a 
result, physicians petitioned legislators to make changes in personal injury 
cases.32  In 1975, California enacted its famous medical malpractice statute 
																																																								
22. See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 438–39, 471. 
23. Id. at 438, 472. 
24. Id. at 472. 
25. See id. at 475–76. 
26. Id. at 474, 523. 
27. See Scott DeVito & Andrew W. Jurs, “Doubling-Down” for Defendants:  
The Pernicious Effects of Tort Reform, 118 PA. ST. L. REV. 543, 549 (2014). 
28. See id. at 544. 
29. See id. at 543–44, 596. 
30. See id. at 543, 546, 549. 
31. Id. at 551; see also Hubbard, supra note 1, at 439. 
32. DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551. 
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that placed a cap on non-monetary awards on pain and suffering, therefore, 
slowing the price increase of medical malpractice premiums.33 
The movement of tort reform in the 1970s focused on placing an 
economical focus on civil litigation and limited the amount of damages that 
could be awarded.34  A decrease in the number of carriers and increase in the 
number of claims caused premiums to rise and created an air of distrust 
towards the court system.35  Subsequently, the medical community blamed 
the judicial system and lobbied the legislature to place limitations on 
recoveries for plaintiffs.36  Nevertheless, many insurers were slow to increase 
and adjust their rates because of the uncertainty of the constitutionality of 
these limits.37 
C. The 1980s and the Reagan Administration 
In the 1980s, the increased tort reform in the United States boosted 
the demand for insurance coverage, and many critics claim that this is a 
cause of the tort reform itself.38  The Reagan Administration blamed the 
insurance crisis of the 1980s on tort reform.39  Groups were formed, such as 
the Tort Policy Working Group, who believed that a doubling in the 1970s of 
lawsuits and an increase in award damages in medical malpractice suits 
would cause individuals to experience a high increase in insurance 
premiums.40  The group recommended for the first time placing caps on 
damage awards and increasing the burden of proof.41 
The Reagan Administration’s Republican platform consisted of 
preventing insurance from rising and blamed the civil suits for the high costs 
of insurance and lack of healthcare available.42  The movement to limit civil 
trials in the courtroom and to decrease costs began to increase momentum 
when many states in the 1980s began a reform to adopt legislation to limit 
recovery on claims.43   As well, many states focused on the abolition or 
																																																								
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 333.2(a)–(b) (West 2015); FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY 
M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 117 (2008). 
34. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 216 (expanded ed. 2003). 
35. DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 549–50. 
36. Id. at 550. 
37. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 33, at 97. 
38. See DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551; Hubbard, supra note 1, at 438. 
39. DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1988:  
AN AMERICAN VISION: FOR OUR CHILDREN AND OUR FUTURE (1988), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25846. 
43. See Devito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551–53. 
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limitation of joint and several liability.44  In joint and several liability, each 
tortfeasor is held liable for damages, and each defendant must then prove that 
they were not the sole proximate cause of the injury.45  The plaintiff may 
elect from the group of defendants which one to seek payment from, but joint 
and several liability is often critiqued in that it entices plaintiffs to seek 
judgment from the wealthiest defendant.46 
Between 1986 and 1987, thirty-five states quickly adapted to tort 
reforms, within them abolishing the common law theory of joint and several 
liability. 47   However, some states, such as Arizona, adopted a slower 
approach by merely limiting joint and several liability.48  Other states, such 
as Florida, moved towards completely abolishing it and received popular 
opposition in its tort reform movements.49  The Supreme Court of Florida 
held that the complete abolition of joint and several liability did not violate 
the U.S. Constitution nor the Florida Constitution under equal protection, due 
process, and access to the courts.50  However, the court ruled that caps on 
non-economic damages violated the Florida Constitution because they deny 
the plaintiff’s access to the courts.51 
III. MODERN ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE TORT REFORM IN MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE 
Tort reform is often looked at as an answer for the insurance crisis.52  
Therefore, because of the connection between insurance companies and 
medical malpractice, this then becomes an area of law often targeted by 
legislators and companies. 53   A second Republican attempt to limit tort 
reform occurred in 2000 with the Bush Administration after a repeated 
insurance crisis.54  The Bush Administration proposed further tort reform by 
imposing a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice 
																																																								
44. See Mike Steenson, Recent Legislative Responses to the Rule of Joint and 
Several Liability, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 482, 485 (1987). 
45. See James J. Scheske, Comment, The Reform of Joint and Several 
Liability Theory:  A Survey of State Approaches, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 627, 635 (1988). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 642. 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 642–43. 
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9, 21; Smith v. Dep’t. 
of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987); Scheske, supra note 45, at 643. 
51. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1095. 
52. See Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails:  A Realistic Remedy for 
the Medical Malpractice “Crisis”, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 478 (2012). 
53. Id. at 480–81. 
54. Id. at 482–83. 
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suits, in response to premium increases in insurance rates.55  However, the 
rise in insurance premiums was due to the rise in medical costs, recovery 
attempts for lost profits, and insurer’s lack of ability to reserve profits for 
down periods.56  None of the factors that caused the higher premiums were 
due to an increase in medical malpractice cases.57  Often politicians have 
mistakenly looked towards tort reform as a solution to resolve the crisis in 
making insurance available to the public; however, repeatedly, this method 
has not worked.58 
A. National Movement for Medical Tort Reform 
Distinct states are each slowly continuing their independent tort 
reform in limiting the ability for plaintiffs to pursue litigation in exchange for 
lower insurance premiums.59  In 2003, Texas enacted an emergency care 
provision requiring a showing of willful and wanton negligence for an 
emergency care provider to be held liable for malpractice.60  In the same 
year, Florida created a strict cap on non-economic damages, making the 
distinction between a cap of $150,000 for emergency care providers versus 
$500,000 for general practitioners.61  Subsequently, Georgia followed the 
distinction in the standard of evidence for malpractice claims between 
emergency physicians and general practitioners. 62   Georgia changed the 
required standard of proof from preponderance of the evidence to a higher 
clear and convincing standard but only when a practitioner has shown a 
standard of gross negligence. 63   Utah, Arizona, and North Carolina 
subsequently followed but with only a heightened clear and convincing 
standard of proof.64 
Increasing the burden of proof and placing caps on the claim amount 
questions whether these methods are constitutional and whether lower 
premiums are paid at the expense of patients who suffer injuries that can be 
																																																								
55. Id. 
56. Alec Shelby Bayer, Comment, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix and Delving 
into the Roots of the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 111, 
118 (2005). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 115–16. 
59. See Sample Legislation, supra note 3. 
60. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153 (West 2003). 
61. Sample Legislation, supra note 3. 
62. See id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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avoided.65  Protection to insurers and health care providers is justified by the 
fear that practitioners will leave the state due to malpractice suits and a 
common objective to reduce defensive medicine. 66   However, with the 
relatively small number of malpractice claims that make it to court, the 
effectiveness of these restrictions becomes questionable. 67   Are patients 
being limited their rights in order to achieve affordable care?68  Will other 
states, such as Florida, with their unique state constitutions be able to follow 
political tort reform to increase efficiency and diminish costs by restricting 
fundamental rights?69 
IV. INCREASING THE BURDEN OF PROOF RATIONALE 
A. Introduction to the Emergency Room Malpractice 
Generally, in civil actions, including medical malpractice, the 
plaintiff has the duty to prove every element of the case by a preponderance 
of evidence.70  Preponderance of evidence means that the plaintiff, in a more 
than probable standard, can establish a persuasive chain of causation between 
the injury and the defendant.71  The evidence must show that it is more 
probable that the practitioner caused the plaintiff’s injury; however, 
causation can often be difficult to prove.72  Defendants in medical claims 
have the ability to blame the injury on many external factors and on the 
plaintiff’s previous medical history. 73   In medical cases, the breach is 
determined in accordance to what the physician should have done 
differently; however, it is not conclusive.74  Emergency claims are made 
even more difficult for a plaintiff when emergency practitioners are not 
required to follow the same standard as the general profession and are 
allowed to use their best judgment.75 
																																																								
65. Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
1201, 1253–54 (2012); Jason R. Graves, Note, State of Emergency:  Why Georgia’s Standard 
of Care in Emergency Rooms is Harmful to Your Health, 45 GA. L. REV. 275, 293 (2010); see 
also Bayer, supra note 56, at 131. 
66. Graves, supra note 65, at 280. 
67. See id. at 291. 
68. See id. at 280. 
69. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Graves, supra note 65, at 281. 
70. Stein, supra note 65, at 1217. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. See id. at 1215–17. 
75. See Stein, supra note 65, at 1212. 
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Emergency care, unlike general care, focuses on the immediate care 
provided to a patient in times of emergency.76  Unlike general practitioners, 
emergency doctors do not have extensive knowledge of the patient’s medical 
history or any prior relationship to the patient, and they must rely on split-
second decisions.77  An emergency physician is responsible for providing 
diagnosis and care to episodic illness.78  Emergency physicians are often 
liable for a broad area of medical expertise unlike other practitioners who are 
able to specialize in a specific area.79  Some states have even allowed other 
medical specialists to serve as expert witnesses against an emergency 
physician.80 
Part of the reasoning behind why many states have taken the 
approach to make a distinction with emergency room practitioners involves 
the fast pace they encounter daily and the distinct regulation from general 
practitioners.81  A greater portion of the population is relying significantly 
more on emergency room services than a clinic with a general practitioner, 
even in situations where an emergency is not warranted.82  As a result, a 
conflict arises in determining what is a true emergency and to what standard 
an emergency practitioner will be held liable.83  Emergency practitioners 
often treat conditions that are not critical but that patients seek because of 
lack of health care based on their financial situation.84 
B. Georgia and Its Reform to Heightened Burden of Proof 
In 2005, the Georgia General Assembly, in Senate Bill 3, reasoned 
that liability insurance caused the state at the time to suffer a crisis that 
affected the quality of health.85  Therefore, the assembly believed that the 
regulation of civil action in the healthcare would resolve the crisis and result 
in stability and predictability in the economy.86  As a result of healthcare 
problems and the individuality of emergency physician malpractice, the State 
of Georgia enacted section 51-1-29.5 of the Georgia Code, establishing that 
no emergency physicians shall be held liable for negligence unless it is 
																																																								
76. RICHARD M. PATTERSON, HARNEY’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 569 (5th ed. 
2011). 
77. See Graves, supra note 65, at 279. 
78. PATTERSON, supra note 76, at 569. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See Stein, supra note 65, at 1212. 
82. Graves, supra note 65, at 298. 
83. PATTERSON, supra note 76, at 569–70. 
84. See Graves, supra note 65, at 298. 
85. Id. at 284; S. 3, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ga. 2005). 
86. See Graves, supra note 65, at 284; Ga. S. 3 § 1. 
9
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proven with a higher clear and convincing standard and with a showing of 
gross negligence.87 
Georgia’s healthcare is unique because most physicians are covered 
by one insurer, MAG Mutual Insurance Company, and therefore, the high 
premium insurance crisis is more evident when there is not much diversity in 
the insurance market for physicians. 88   Besides lacking competition in 
insurance, another cause of the health care crisis was affirmative duty 
statutes that required public hospitals to treat all patients who seek care in 
emergency rooms.89  Georgia’s affirmative duty to treat all patients often led 
to hospitals being over-occupied with higher traffic, forcing emergency 
physicians to work at a faster pace. 90   While Georgia blamed medical 
malpractice cases for the lack of affordability in insurance, distinct factors 
accelerated the insurance crisis in Georgia.91  For example, competition with 
one of the greatest health insurance companies, St. Paul Insurance Company, 
ultimately caused competition to rise to the point where premium rates 
dropped rapidly until insurance companies were no longer capable of 
providing coverage at such low rates.92 
The Georgia General Assembly introduced Senate Bill 3 with the 
purpose to lower healthcare costs and make healthcare more accessible.93  
However, Senate Bill 3 raised much opposition from individuals, such as 
Senator David Adelman, who commented that by raising the burden of proof, 
it would, as a result, become difficult for those patients who suffer from 
injury or even death to seek justice in the law.94  When the legislators raised 
the standard of proof to clear and convincing, they made it nearly 
impossible—or at least almost to the criminal standard of a beyond a 
reasonable doubt—for a plaintiff to bring a successful claim against an 
emergency physician.95  Not only has the legislature raised the standard, but 
it has also changed the negligence norm to a gross negligence standard, 
which is almost a “mission impossible for plaintiffs.”96 
																																																								
87. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) (2015). 
88. Graves, supra note 65, at 284, 301. 
89. See Williams v. Hosp. Auth. of Hall Cty., 168 S.E.2d 336, 337 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1969); Graves, supra note 65, at 301. 
90. See Williams, 168 S.E.2d at 337; Jade Hindmon, E.R. Overcrowding, 
WTVM, http://www.wtvm.com/story/4710750/er-overcrowding (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
91. See Graves, supra note 65, at 299–300. 
92. Id. at 301. 
93. Id. at 284; see also S. 3, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 1(a), 8(c) (Ga. 
2005). 
94. See Ga. S. 3 § 8(c); Graves, supra note 65, at 287. 
95. See Graves, supra note 65, at 287, 289. 
96. Graves, supra note 65, at 287. 
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1. Georgia’s Conflict with Clear and Convincing 
The Supreme Court of Georgia’s ruling in Gliemmo v. Cousineau,97 
faced public backlash after the passing of Senate Bill 3, when a medical 
malpractice action was filed questioning the constitutionality of Georgia’s 
heightened burden of proof and the raised standard of gross negligence.98  
Plaintiffs in this case alleged that the distinction between emergency room 
and general medical malpractice cases violated Georgia’s Constitution 
because it provided a special laws clause, which made any law that is not 
applied uniformly, unconstitutional.99  Due to the uniqueness in the Georgia 
Constitution, the court held that a gross negligence and heightened burden of 
proof was constitutional because it was not a special law, and it did not deny 
equal protection and due process.100 
The plaintiffs in Gliemmo alleged that because section 51-1-29.5(c) 
only applies to some emergency physicians, it is considered a special law 
that discriminates against practitioners outside the emergency room and thus, 
is in violation of the Georgia Constitution.101  The court reasoned that the 
statute is not a special law because it is applied uniformly to all claims in 
emergency care and without a specific time frame. 102   The General 
Assembly’s legislative intent behind the distinct treatment showed that both 
emergency and general practitioners are having great difficulty affording 
insurance, and because emergency care is distinct from general care, it is 
sufficient to heighten the burden of proof to reach those goals.103  However, 
the court and the legislature do not discuss doctors who are not emergency 
physicians but who undergo similar emergency situations, and patients with 
severe injuries and yet do not qualify for a heightened burden of proof.104  
This argument will be discussed further in depth later in this Comment.105  
Subsequently, the court then cites to State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 
																																																								
97. 694 S.E.2d 75 (Ga. 2010). 
98. Id. at 77; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) (2015); S. 3, 148th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005). 
99. Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 77 (emphasis added). 
100. Id. at 79–80; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV(c). 
101. Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 77; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c). 
102. Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 78–79; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. 
IV(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c). 
103. Gliemmo, 694 S.E. 2d at 79. 
104. See id. 
105. See infra Section V.A.2. 
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v. Five Transportation Co.,106 which held that treatment that is not uniformly 
identically applied does not necessarily offend the Georgia Constitution.107 
V. IN FLORIDA’S CASE 
A. Florida’s Tort Reform Direction 
1. Introduction 
Tort reform is becoming a popular new movement, which all states 
are taking part in but that many face conflict with because of the 
individuality of each state’s constitution.108  In order to understand whether 
Florida can continue its tort reform path, it is essential to understand the case 
law and special constitutional provisions that do not allow Florida to 
continue tort reform like its sister state, Georgia. 109   In Georgia, the 
legislature has successfully enacted statutes that increase the standard of the 
proof that makes it close to impossible for a victim to successfully bring a 
case to court.110  Contrastingly, the effectiveness of tort reform in states such 
as Florida becomes questionable when Florida still has some of the highest 
insurance premiums in the country even when it has different cap amounts in 
place and expert witness reform.111 
a. 1986 Florida Reform 
The Medical Malpractice Reform Act, one of Florida’s earliest 
reforms in 1975, was enacted in order to diminish the cost of medical 
insurance to patients at a time when the state began to suffer through a health 
care crisis, and the cost of insurance was excessively gross.112  In Florida, the 
tort reform movement did not become recognized until a move from the 
contributory negligence standard to the comparative negligence norm 
occurred in Hoffman v. Jones, 113  to adopt a more equitable system of 
																																																								
106. 271 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 1980). 
107. Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 79; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 271 S.E.2d at 
848; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV. 
108. See Roslund, supra note 11. 
109. See supra Section IV.B; infra Sections V.A.1.a–c, V.A.2. 
110. See Roslund, supra note 11. 
111. See id.; Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 934 (Fla. 
2014). 
112. Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75–79, 1975 Fla. Laws 13; 
see also Thomas Horenkamp, Comment, The New Florida Medical Malpractice Legislation 
and Its Likely Constitutional Challenges, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2004). 
113. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). 
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relief.114  Notably, the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 demonstrated 
that Florida’s aim to move towards comparative fault in negligence cases.115  
This would be the first attempt to slowly abolish the doctrine of joint and 
several liability in Florida.116  Subsequent reforms followed the passage of 
section 768.81, such as allocating fault to the plaintiff and removing joint 
and several liability to a defendant who has a less percentage of fault, which 
changed medical malpractice law.117  The 1986 reform was based on the 
legislature’s attempt to decrease insurance premiums and as a result, 
implemented insurance profit laws and insurance rate rollbacks.118 
b. Republicans Make the Change 
In 1996, Florida gained a Republican majority controlling the 
Florida House and Senate, which caused the legislators to aim their focus on 
improving business relations in Florida.119  The changes in office began a 
movement to change the civil court system in order to increase prosperity for 
insurance companies. 120   The legislators gained wide support for the 
limitation of litigation; they claimed that the floodgate of civil cases in the 
courthouses was causing insurance companies and the market to fail in 
Florida.121  Despite the fact that in 1996 Florida’s economy was strong as the 
gross state product rose by 19.5%, the unemployment rate fell by 4.9%, and 
Florida ranked third in greatest number of new businesses, legislators still 
blamed the small percentage of civil cases in Florida for a non-existent 
decline.122  Further statistics in the 1990s show that medical claims were not 
the culprit because when the 1986 reform was passed negligence cases only 
consisted of 8.9% of civil cases, and they have been in decline since 1990.123  
																																																								
114. Id. at 438. 
115. Michael S. Hooker & Guy P. McConnell, Joint and Several Liability in 
Florida:  Are Reports of Its Demise Greatly Exaggerated?, FLA. B. J., Dec. 2006, at 10, 12; 
see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2014). 
116. Hooker & McConnell, supra note 115, at 12; see also FLA. STAT. § 
768.81. 
117. Hooker & McConnell, supra note 115, at 12; see also FLA. STAT. § 
768.81. 
118. Kenneth D. Kranz, Tort Reform 1997–98:  Profits v. People?, 25 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 161, 163–64 (1998). 
119. Id. at 165. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. See id.; Robert S. Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999:  A Building Without a 
Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 433 (2000). 
123. Kranz, supra note 118, at 176–77. 
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The only increase that has occurred in civil cases is due to the standard 
population increase of Floridians.124 
c. House Bill 775 
In 1999, Florida once again made changes to tort law with the 
passage of House Bill 775 that reformed joint and several liability, punitive 
damages, statute of repose, and vicarious liability in motor vehicle cases.125  
The doctrine of joint and several liability was further limited in the 1999 
reform when a plaintiff’s economic losses were limited to a total of a one 
million dollar cap, but it only applied when the defendant was more than 
fifty percent at fault. 126   Significantly, under the new reform, multiple 
defendants could not be held to be joint and severally liable for more than 
one million dollars.127 
A common method used by tort reformists in order to gain public 
support for the limitation of the civil litigation system was the reference to a 
fictitious tort tax to the public.128  Reference to the tort law system as a tax 
on civilians was used to quickly gain negative opposition against individuals 
who brought claims to court. 129   Vice President Dan Quayle made a 
statement to a group of business leaders that the tort litigation system costs 
Americans three hundred billion dollars, a figure that has no statistical 
support but that quickly gained momentum. 130   Fictitious information, 
negative terminology, such as tort tax, and company lobbyists have falsely 
led the tort reform in Florida when no accurate information demonstrates that 
civil litigation burdens Florida’s economy in any manner.131  Other costs, 
such as natural disasters—specifically hurricanes—have caused a decline in 
Florida’s economy, but are not accounted for when the legislature looks for a 
culprit in the downfall of the economy.132 
																																																								
124. Id. at 177. 
125. H.B. 775, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1999) (Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, 
ch. 99-225, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400); Peck et al., supra note 122, at 406. 
126. Peck et al., supra note 122, at 409. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 421. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 421–22. 
131. See Peck et al., supra note 122, at 422. 
132. Id. at 426. 
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2. Medical Malpractice Reform Gains Momentum 
In 2003, the legislature focused its attempts on medical malpractice 
cases by placing statutory caps on non-economic damages.133  The medical 
malpractice reform also enacted provisionary steps to protect consumers 
from medical negligence, such as allowing insurance companies to avoid suit 
by tendering the limit of the defendant’s policy in two hundred ten days.134  
The 2003 legislature also expressed that the new cap on non-economic 
damages would be on an aggregate basis, and in cases where there were 
several plaintiffs, the cap would be even lower. 135   As a result, section 
766.118 of the Florida Statutes was enacted to limit the amount of non-
economic damages a plaintiff could receive to five hundred dollars per 
claimant.136  The statute aimed at limiting frivolous lawsuits and enforcing 
mediation before trial in order to protect insurance companies from excessive 
claims.137  In order to pass the Statute, Senate Bill 2-D provided several 
legislative findings, many are no longer presently applicable.138 
Overall, the 2003 Florida Legislature for Senate Bill 2-D found that 
Florida was in the middle of a medical malpractice crisis and that it caused 
decreased availability of healthcare for Floridians.139  The legislature claimed 
that Florida is one of the states with the highest medical malpractice 
insurance and therefore reasoned that this was why medical practitioners 
were leaving Florida.140  The legislature reasoned that it could not provide its 
citizens with access to proper healthcare when doctors were leaving the state 
to practice somewhere else with lower insurance premiums.141  As a result, 
the legislature publicized a correlation between the numbers of doctors 
leaving the state; nonetheless it was only anecdotal data that was merely 
implied.142 
Organizations, such as the American Medical Association, have 
blamed the American jury system for the increase in insurance premium 
																																																								
133. Tracy S. Carlin, Medical Malpractice Caps Move from the Legislature to 
the Courts:  Will They Survive?, FLA. B. J., May 2004, at 10, 10. 
134. See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1290–91. 
135. See S.B. 2-D, 2003 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Fla. 2003); Horenkamp, supra note 
112, at 1289. 
136. FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2)(a) (2014); Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1290. 
137. See FLA. STAT. § 766.118; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1289, 1291. 
138. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 913 (Fla. 2014) 
(discussing that in Florida there no longer exists a healthcare crisis to provide a rational basis 
for caps); Fla. S.B. 2-D; infra Part V.C. 
139. See Fla. S.B. 2-D; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1299–1300. 
140. Fla. S.B. 2-D; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1298. 
141. See Fla. S.B. 2-D; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1298–99. 
142. Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1302. 
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costs and the limitation of accessibility to healthcare.143  Tactics to support 
the allegation of excessive jury awards include placing emphasis on 
individual high jury awards and claiming that the award system is the true 
culprit.144  Insurance companies repeatedly claim that litigation and excessive 
awards are responsible for the national crisis and high costs of healthcare, 
however, significant data shows otherwise.145  In 2001, a total of 1303 claims 
were made against doctors in Florida that totaled to $361.1 million.146  If 
insurance companies claim that medical malpractice suits are driving doctors 
out of Florida and are excessive, the numbers of the amount of cases that 
actually make it to court do not match the allegations.147 
Other arguments made by tort reformers are that jurors are often 
sympathetic to plaintiffs because they only see the injuries caused and that 
often the medical standard is too complex for them to understand, even with 
expert testimony.148  Tort reformers argue that medical malpractice is too 
complex for jurors because it involves multiple parties, difficult medical 
issues, and a complex method to award appropriate damages.149  However, 
all these legislative findings on the need for tort reform in the medical 
malpractice area do not discuss how insurance premium costs have increased 
due to the losses in the reserve amount of negligent doctors and the lack of 
proper management of healthcare companies in the industry.150 
In 2004, further reforms continued as Florida passed the Three 
Strikes Rule, also referred to as Amendment 8, which became section 456.50 
of the Florida Statute.151  The Act focused on preventing physicians who 
have repeatedly committed malpractice from maintaining or obtaining a 
physician’s license. 152   While the Act may at first seem to benefit the 
plaintiff, the Act also heightens the standard of proof required to deny a 
license to a physician to a clear and convincing standard if the act or acts are 
not part of the Amendment 8 list.153  This standard is the same standard of 
proof required in Georgia against emergency physicians, with the exception 
																																																								
143. Id. at 1305. 
144. Id. at 1306–07. 
145. See id. at 1305–07. 
146. Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1307. 
147. See id. at 1306–07. 
148. Edward L. Holloran, III, Comment, Medical Malpractice Litigation in 
Florida:  Discussion of Problems and Recommendations, 26 NOVA L. REV. 331, 335–36 
(2001). 
149. Id. 
150. Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1312. 
151. FLA. STAT. § 456.50 (2014); Dinah Stein, Florida’s “Three Strikes” 
Legislation:  A Defense Perspective, 29 TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2010, at 22, 22. 
152. FLA. STAT. § 456.50(2); Stein, supra note 151, at 22–23. 
153. See FLA. STAT. § 456.50; Stein, supra note 151, at 22–23. 
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that in Florida, physicians must have committed three malpractice acts or 
their license will be removed.154  This heightened standard makes imposing 
strikes almost impossible and a finding of ordinary negligence would not be 
sufficient to impose a strike on a practitioner under section 456.50.155  A 
greater standard of evidence required to remove a physician’s license is 
argued because the right to practice medicine is seen as valuable property, 
and removal of a license limits a basic right, which would deprive doctors of 
due process.156  The right to practice medicine is recognized as a federal 
constitutional property right that the Florida Legislature cannot limit under 
the Supremacy Clause.157  However, a plaintiff’s right to access the courts 
and be able to seek redress for their injury is an equally protected right under 
the Florida Constitution.158 
B. Access to the Courts 
In accordance with the Florida Constitution, “[t]he courts shall be 
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be 
administered without sale, denial or delay.” 159   Although the U.S. 
Constitution does not expressly provide access to the courts, it is implied 
through the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.160  Often 
Florida’s access to courts is one of the main criticisms of tort reform, but it 
raises the main question of who should bear the responsibility to compensate:  
the aggrieved individual, the tortfeasor or the taxpayers?161  Further, conflict 
arises when society is forced to pay for the wrongdoers’ actions. 162  
Therefore, because of the access to courts provision, Florida is more 
susceptible to challenge any new tort reform that may deny citizens their 
right to redress.163 
																																																								
154. Compare FLA. STAT. § 456.50(1)(h), with GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) 
(2015). 
155. See FLA. STAT. § 456.50; Stein, supra note 151, at 23. 
156. Stein, supra note 151, at 23, 26. 
157. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Stein, supra note 151, at 26. 
158. See FLA. CONST. art. I § 21. 
159. Id. 
160. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
161. See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1292. 
162. Id. 
163. See id. 
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1. Kluger v. White 
As established by Kluger v. White,164 access to the courts is given to 
Floridians as a fundamental right in their constitution and can only be 
removed in two circumstances:  (1) when there is a reasonable alternative to 
protect the right to redress for injuries or (2) “an overpowering public 
necessity for the abolishment of [the] right, and [that] no alternative method 
of meeting [the] public necessity can be shown.”165  However, protection 
under access to the courts is only extended to rights that existed at common 
law, such as personal injury claims.166  The holding of Kluger was essential 
to bring awareness into Florida on whether the tort reform was violating an 
individual’s access to the courts by increasing the difficulty for a plaintiff to 
seek relief.167  The Supreme Court of Florida addressed that the legislation 
cannot abolish the right to access the courts without providing an alternative 
to guarantee an individual a way to redress.168 
2. Mitchell v. Moore and Defining an Overpowering Public Necessity 
Denial of an individual’s access to the courts includes burdening or 
restricting an individual’s access right to redress.169  In Mitchell v. Moore,170 
a prisoner sought his petition to be reviewed by the appellate court; however, 
his petition was denied unless he filed various copies of the pleadings.171  
The petitioner stated that this was a violation of his access to courts 
guaranteed by the Florida Constitution because it was unduly burdensome in 
his condition as a prisoner to provide additional copies.172  The Supreme 
Court of Florida agreed that the statute requiring him to provide extensive 
copies only provided difficulty and delay with no possible alternative to 
access the courts for the prisoners.173  Therefore, if a fundamental interest is 
being taken, then the statute must meet the rational basis test and strict 
scrutiny test.174  The court in Mitchell held that the compelling government 
interest is equivalent to the overpowering public necessity and, therefore, the 
statute was to be held under a strict scrutiny analysis instead of a lower 
																																																								
164. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). 
165. Id. at 4 (emphasis added); see also FLA CONST. art. I § 21. 
166. See Fla. Const. art. I § 21; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. 
167. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 10; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1292–93. 
168. Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. 
169. Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001). 
170. 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001). 
171. Id. at 523–24. 
172. See id. at 524; FLA CONST. art. I § 21.  
173. Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 525. 
174. Id. at 527. 
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rational basis standard. 175   However, this all applies if the legislature’s 
finding to limit access to the courts is current, and in cases where legislative 
findings do not parallel the present findings, the court has the ability to 
correct them.176 
C. Estate of McCall Changes Florida’s Justification for Tort Reform 
One of the most recent Supreme Court of Florida cases, Estate of 
McCall, directly addresses the alleged medical malpractice crisis in 
Florida.177  In Estate of McCall, a woman named “Michelle McCall received 
prenatal medical care [from] a United States Air Force clinic” when she was 
diagnosed with severe preeclampsia.178  The patient was treated by the family 
practice department instead of the required obstetrics-gynecology.179  Since 
the Air Force hospital was unavailable, the patient was transferred to the Fort 
Walton Beach Medical Center where she delivered the baby. 180   Dr. 
Archibald, the obstetrician in charge of the procedures, left after the delivery, 
but he was called after the family practitioner could not remove the placenta, 
and the patient had already lost a great amount of blood.181  The practitioners 
informed Dr. Archibald of the blood loss; however, forty minutes thereafter, 
a nurse attempted to draw blood from Ms. McCall.182  As a result, Ms. 
McCall underwent cardiac arrest and never regained consciousness.183  The 
district court awarded a total of $2,000,000—$500,000 for her son and 
$750,000 for each of her parents.184  However, with the application of section 
766.118(2), the cap on wrongful death cases, the case was limited to 
$1,000,000.185  The petitioners then appealed the case on the basis that the 
cap violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution, was an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment, 
and was a violation of Florida’s right of access to the courts, the right to jury 
trial, and equal protection under the Florida Constitution.186 
																																																								
175. Id. at 528, 531. 
176. See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1294. 
177. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 897 (Fla. 2014). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 898. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 898–99. 
182. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 898–99. 
183. Id. at 899. 
184. Id. 
185. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2014); Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899. 
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§§ 2, 21–22; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899. 
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1. Why Estate of McCall Matters 
Although Estate of McCall is a wrongful death case that discusses 
the constitutionality of caps on medical malpractice claims, for the purposes 
of this Comment we will only discuss the effect Estate of McCall has on 
medical malpractice claims in Florida, and the continuation of further tort 
reform.187  The court in Estate of McCall ruled that the statutory cap on 
wrongful death cases violates the Equal Protection Clause under the Florida 
Constitution because there is no longer a rational basis reasoning for a 
legitimate state objective behind it.188  Where the importance of the recent 
case is the court’s explanation and reasoning behind why the caps are 
unconstitutional; the court analyzes the present day situation in Florida with 
the alleged medical malpractice case.189 
In Estate of McCall, the court addressed the responsibility given 
under Warren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.190 to assure 
that the statute that was passed serves a legitimate government purpose and 
therefore, obligates itself to analyze the alleged insurance crisis.191  The court 
discussed the reasoning that the Florida Legislature has utilized in order to 
enact statutes limiting malpractice liability; the Florida Legislature Task 
Force has alleged that Florida has such a high cost of insurance premiums 
that it has forced medical practitioners to leave the state. 192   The court 
dismissed this finding and asserts that in 2003, “the United States General 
Accounting Office [(“GAO”)] found that from 1991 to 2001, [the amount of 
physicians] grew from 214 to 237 in metropolitan areas.”193  This is contrary 
to the Task Force’s findings that malpractice litigation was driving 
practitioners out and limiting the availability of health care to 
practitioners.194  As well, the alleged increase of jury verdicts statement by 
the Task Force has been exaggerated—a study revealed that only 7.5% of 
malpractice cases actually involve a jury trial verdict, and most of the cases 
were resolved in settlements.195  Therefore, as the court stated, the Task 
																																																								
187. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§§ 2, 21–22; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899. 
188. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 905, 914–15. 
189. Id. 
190. 899 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2005). 
191. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 905–06; Warren, 899 So. 2d at 1095. 
192. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906; JOHN C. HITT ET AL., GOVERNOR’S 
SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE LIABILITY INSURANCE XVII (2003). 
193. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906. 
194. See id.; Hitt et al., supra note 192, at XVII. 
195. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906; Hitt et al., supra note 192, at 64. 
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Force’s findings that jury awards in medical malpractice cases were the 
culprits for the increased costs of insurance are deemed most questionable.196 
The court quotes the opinion of Joanne Doroshow, Executive 
Director of the Center for Justice and Democracy, who claims that: 
[T]his so-called crisis is nothing more than the underwriting cycle 
of the insurance industry, and driven by the same factors that 
caused the crises in the 1970s and 1980s . . . .  [W]ith each crisis, 
there has been a severe drop in the investment income for insurers, 
which has been compounded by sever[e] under-pricing of 
insurance premiums . . . .  [D]uring years of high interest rates or 
excellent insur[ance] profits that are invested for maximum return, 
the insurance companies engage in fierce competition . . . .  
[W]hen investment income drops . . . the insurance industry 
responds by sharply increasing premiums and reducing coverage.  
[T]ort reform changes in the 1980s . . . was caused instead by [the] 
modulations in the insurance cycle throughout the country.197 
The court acknowledged that the reason for the insurance crisis in 
Florida was due to the increases in the amount of money that insurance 
companies place for reserve. 198   The allegation that insurance is driving 
practitioners out of Florida is not supported because the practitioners are 
leaving to other states, such as North Carolina, that have the same crisis with 
high malpractice insurance rates.199  The alleged statement that the number of 
frivolous lawsuits has allegedly increased in Florida is contradicted by the 
deputy director of Florida Office of Insurance Regulations who confirmed 
that there is no evidence of an increase in the number of frivolous lawsuits or 
excessive jury verdicts.200 
In accordance with the GAO, some providers have even purported 
that because of the medical malpractice suits, physicians are forced to cut 
back on services that are seen as high risk.201  However, the GAO debunked 
that allegation as unrepresentative of the physician population as the surveys 
only had a twenty percent response rate. 202   The American Medical 
Association claimed that twenty-four percent of physicians stopped 
performing these procedures but failed to mention that responses for the 
																																																								
196. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906; HITT ET AL., supra note 192, at 64. 
197. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 907–08 (alteration in original) (emphasis 
added); see also HITT ET AL., supra note 192, at 64. 
198. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 908. 
199. Id. at 909. 
200. Id. at 908. 
201. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: 
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 20 (2003). 
202. Id. 
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survey were only ten percent.203  States with caps on non-economic damages 
claim that they have lower premium rates because of this; however, they 
exclude many factors such as hospitals and nursing homes.204  Other factors, 
such as the manner in which plaintiffs are permitted to collect damages, alter 
the award amount depending on whether the plaintiff files claims for 
multiple defendants together or individually.205 
Today, even if Florida was in the same medical crisis as it was in the 
1980s, a crisis is not a permanent condition.206  The court emphasizes that, 
“even if section 766.118 may have been rational when it was enacted . . . it 
will no longer be rational where the factual premise upon which the statute 
was based has changed.”207  Florida courts have a duty to evaluate both data 
before a statute is passed and its constitutionality after. 208   Further data 
contradicts any allegations of lack of access to healthcare when there are 
more active physicians in Florida than in the past, while, at the same time, 
the Office of State Courts Administrator reports that medical malpractice 
cases in Florida have decreased from 5829 to only 2491 in 2012.209  In 2003, 
the 5829 medical malpractice cases only constituted 3% of civil actions, and 
later the actions filed for medical malpractice decreased by more than 60% in 
2012.210 
As a result of the court’s findings, the Supreme Court of Florida 
established that there is no current medical malpractice crisis in Florida and 
that if there was in the past, it was no longer practical.211  The lack of a 
present medical malpractice crisis denies any rational basis reasoning to 
impose caps by section 766.118 and any legitimate state purpose to limit 
litigation, equal protection, and access to the courts.212  Nonetheless, the 
court decided not to answer any of the remaining questions regarding access 
to the courts because Estate of McCall was a wrongful death case, which is 
not considered common law or a statute protected by the Florida 
Constitution.213 
																																																								
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 30. 
205. Id. at 37. 
206. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 907, 913 (Fla. 2014); 
see also HITT ET AL., supra note 192, at 64. 
207. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913. 
208. See id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 21; 
FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2014). 
213. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 915. 
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2. No Alternative Method 
With Estate of McCall proving that there no longer exists a rational 
basis for medical malpractice reform, it is even more prevalent that any new 
reform in Florida would violate the Florida Constitution’s right of access to 
the courts and equal protection.214  In University of Miami v. Echarte,215 the 
court held that mandatory arbitration and monetary caps on non-economic 
damages in medical malpractice claims are not unconstitutional because they 
“are necessary to meet the medical malpractice crisis” even when they limit 
an individual’s access to the courts. 216   In Echarte, the court states that 
monetary caps on non-economic damages, known as the Medical 
Malpractice Reform Act, satisfies both the overpowering necessity and no 
alternative method of the Kluger test when a party is forced to request 
arbitration first.217  Nonetheless, Echarte denies a plaintiff the right to access 
when they force a plaintiff to receive a lower amount of damages if they 
deny arbitration.218 
The arbitration option enforced in Echarte is no longer constitutional 
because under the new findings, it does not pass the Kluger test.219  The 
legislature can no longer show an overpowering public necessity for 
abolishment of a right and no reasonable alternative without limiting access 
to the courts.220  In this situation, the plaintiff is undercompensated both 
when they choose arbitration and decide to go to trial, even though it is at the 
benefit of the defendant.221  Not only is the plaintiff limited from being able 
to bring their claim to court as guaranteed under the Florida Constitution, but 
they are also denied full compensation with no legitimate rational reasoning 
behind it.222  Florida’s Malpractice Act allows jurors to use the caps of non-
economic damages and leave a plaintiff undercompensated when they 
																																																								
214. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 21; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913. 
215. 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993). 
216. Id. at 197–98. 
217. Id. at 194–97; Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 766.207(7)(b). 
218. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 197; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; FLA. STAT. § 
766.207; Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Comment, Florida’s Comprehensive Medical Malpractice 
Reform Act:  Is It Time for a Change?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 551, 565–66 (1996). 
219. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914; Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 197; 
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4; Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 565–66. 
220. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 563; see also Estate of McCall, 134 So. 
3d at 914; Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 197. 
221. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 558. 
222. Id. at 561–62; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 
194. 
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suffered an incredible loss. 223   The arbitration option and other medical 
malpractice reforms punish the plaintiff when they do not seek arbitration 
because they wish to take their case to court.224  Further medical tort reform, 
such as increasing the burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard 
when treated by emergency physicians, would further punish and delay the 
plaintiff’s right to redress.225 
3. North Broward Hospital District v. Kalitan 
Estate of McCall opens the door to future litigation when it questions 
the constitutionality of non-economic caps and when it completely exposes a 
no longer present need for limitations on plaintiffs based on their injuries.226  
In the recent Fourth District Court of Appeal case North Broward Hospital 
District v. Kalitan, 227  a patient brought an action against a hospital for 
medical malpractice when she suffered a catastrophic injury. 228   The 
plaintiff’s injuries consisted of an induced coma for several weeks, upper 
body pain, mental disorders, and loss of independence.229  The jury found in 
favor of the plaintiff and determined that the plaintiff had suffered a 
catastrophic injury and awarded a total of $4,718,011 in total damages as 
well as a total of $4,000,000 in non-economic damages.230  The trial court 
then moved to limit the amount of non-economic damages to $2,000,000 
under section 766.118(2) of the Florida Statutes and was furthered capped 
under sovereign entity to $1,300,000.231 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal then moved to reference Estate 
of McCall to analyze whether section 766.118 of the Florida Statutes applies 
to both personal injury and wrongful death cases.232  The court determined 
that, as established under Estate of McCall, if there is no longer an objective 
for the statute, then there is no longer a legitimate state objective to which 
the caps can rationally relate.233  Although Estate of McCall specifically 
refers to wrongful death cases, when the statute’s objective as a whole is 
																																																								
223. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 564; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7) 
(2014). 
224. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 565. 
225. See Stein, supra note 151, at 22–23. 
226. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913. 
227. 174 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
228. Id. at 405. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 406. 
231. Id. at 407; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2014). 
232. Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2)(a); Estate of 
McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 915 (Fla. 2014). 
233. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901; Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
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discredited then reference to personal injury cases applies as well.234  It is a 
violation of equal protection when non-economic caps discriminate and 
allow claimants with little non-economic damages to claim all the damages, 
while claimants with serious injuries are capped.235  In Kalitan, the court 
demonstrates the intention to limit tort reform after Estate of McCall brought 
to light the lack of rational basis for distinction among medical malpractice 
plaintiffs.236  The Kalitan court decided not to address the statute’s violation 
to access to courts or jury trials because Estate of McCall rationale applies to 
medical malpractice actions in general.237 
4. Florida Cannot Continue in Its Tort Reform 
What makes Estate of McCall so essential to today’s tort reform in 
Florida is the assertion that Florida is no longer in a medical malpractice 
insurance crisis; therefore, the court’s findings question the constitutionality 
of past reforms and any future attempts.238  Estate of McCall sets a distinct 
precedent for future cases and legislative actions; it limits any possibility of 
Florida continuing tort reform.239  Unlike the state of Georgia that overcame 
the equal protection hurdle in order to enact a heightened burden of proof 
when the legislature increased the standard, a similar reform would not pass 
Florida’s scrutiny.240  Florida’s case law, such as Kluger, Estate of McCall, 
and now Kalitan, note that there is no longer an overpowering public 
necessity and rational basis to place any more limitations on a plaintiff.241  
There no longer exists a compelling reason for unequal treatment towards 
plaintiffs with different injuries—whether wrongful death or personal 
injury.242  Florida no longer has legislative findings to prove that it is still in a 
medical crisis.243 
Nevertheless, because Florida under Kluger requires a test of 
overpowering necessity, it will be unsuccessful in enacting and justifying any 
further tort reform.244   The legislature is now unable to provide rational 
																																																								
234. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 897; Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
235. Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
236. See id. at 409, 10; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901. 
237. FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 21–22; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901; 
Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
238. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913. 
239. See id. at 931. 
240. Id. at 916; Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 694 S.E.2d 75, 80 (Ga. 2010). 
241. See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4–5 (Fla. 1973); Estate of McCall, 134 
So. 3d at 901, 936; Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411. 
242. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901, 916. 
243. Id. at 906. 
244. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4 (emphasis added). 
25
Diaz: The Real Emergency: Will Florida Follow georgia In Medical Malpra
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
210 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
reasons for the different treatment for those individuals who suffer serious 
near death injuries caused by negligence, but who are forced to cap their 
damages.245  In contrast, plaintiffs in wrongful death cases have unlimited 
damages.246  The legislature also cannot pass the first part of Kluger with a 
reasonable alternative when the alternative is to go to arbitration.247  Even if 
arbitration is no longer mandatory, rather voluntary, it becomes mandatory 
when the plaintiff’s non-economic damages are capped even further.248  The 
alternative arbitration creates a greater burden on the plaintiff, and it 
discourages the parties from settling.249 
Florida already places caps on emergency practitioners and limits the 
award of non-economic damages available to plaintiffs who underwent 
medical care by an emergency physician to $150,000.250   Increasing the 
burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard and gross negligence, like 
Georgia, would potentially deny an individual the right to access the courts, 
equal protection, and a full recovery.251  If Florida attempts to continue tort 
reform by increasing the standard of proof, the plaintiff in an emergency 
practitioner claim would have to undergo arbitration, show negligence by a 
clear and convincing standard, and then be forced to limit the amount of 
damages.252  The plaintiff will also have to prove by a clear and convincing 
standard to a lay jury who may have trouble with medical terminology 
comprehension.253 
A plaintiff can no longer be labeled in accordance to the injury he or 
she suffered.254  A clear and convincing standard proposal in Florida will be 
subject to strict scrutiny because a justification for limitations would no 
longer exist, as malpractice claims are not the cause of high cost of 
insurance.255  As established by the court in Estate of McCall, “[h]ealth care 
policy that relies upon discrimination against Florida families is not rational 
																																																								
245. Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 563–64. 
246. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 915. 
247. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4; Fonseca-Nader, 
supra note 218, at 560–61, 565. 
248. See Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 560–61, 564–65. 
249. See id. at 560–62. 
250. FLA. STAT. § 766.118(4)(a) (2014). 
251. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; GA. CODE ANN. § 
51-1-29.5(c) (2015); Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001) (denying or 
burdening an individual’s access to the courts violates the Florida Constitution). 
252. See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.118(4)(a), .207(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) 
(2015). 
253. Holloran, III, supra note 148, at 343–44. 
254. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 914–15 (Fla. 
2014). 
255. Id. at 914; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c); Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 
527; Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). 
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or reasonable when it attempts . . . to create unreasonable classifications.”256  
Making a distinction between patients who were treated in an emergency 
room, in contrast from those who were treated in a clinic, makes the same 
unreasonable classification.257  Forcing a plaintiff to demonstrate a showing 
of the clear and convincing standard of gross negligence based on which 
hospital door they entered would substantially burden and restrict a 
plaintiff’s right to redress.258 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, Florida can no longer justify any new tort reforms, 
especially in the area of medical malpractice.259   There no longer exists 
legislative reasoning to limit the right of access to the courts and equal 
protection; the legislature can no longer enact statutes that limit the 
plaintiff’s right to sue malpractice doctors.260  A statute like Georgia’s statute 
that increases the burden of proof would violate Florida’s unique right of 
access to the courts clause because it would almost make it impossible for a 
plaintiff to bring a claim to court against an emergency physician when there 
is no source of rational reasoning or need for such limitation.261  Historically, 
Florida has always been a state leading in tort reform; nonetheless, the new 
findings force the courts to reevaluate the constitutionality of statutes that 
reflect the needs of the state at the time they were enacted.262  Doctors are not 
leaving the State of Florida anymore and so ensuring access to medical care 
is not reasoning behind further reform.263  Moreover, the arbitration option as 
an alternative to limit access to the courts works towards the detriment of the 
plaintiff by capping them at an even lower rate when they already have caps 
in place at court.264  Arbitration is not a good alternative; it penalizes a 
plaintiff for seeking justice in the law and it does not penalize a party who 
does not want to settle.265 
Florida healthcare is at a high rate, and many individuals seek care 
from emergency rooms because of their financial situation.266  However, the 
																																																								
256. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 915. 
257. See id.; Graves, supra note 65, at 293. 
258. See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527; Graves, supra note 65, at 293. 
259. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914. 
260. See id.; Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527. 
261. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) (2015); Estate 
of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914. 
262. See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1287, 1292. 
263. See id. at 1302. 
264. See Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 568. 
265. Id. 
266. See Graves, supra note 65, at 298. 
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number of medical claims is not the cause of the healthcare problem.267  
Florida needs to note that it is not in the same medical crisis as it was in the 
1980s, and it must address all the limitations it has placed on plaintiffs who 
are denied their access to the courts and equal protection when they suffer an 
injury from medical practitioners.268  The Equal Protection Clause is violated 
when patients with different injuries are treated differently with no rational 
basis for discrimination.269  In the case of emergency practitioners, it is noted 
that they undergo distinct exposure from those practitioners in the normal 
practice, and it may seem logical that other malpractice suits may arise from 
this.270  However, the type of environment that emergency practitioners are 
involved and trained in does not give rational reasoning to limit basic Florida 
constitutional rights.271  The right of access to the courts in article I, section 
21 of the Florida Constitution cannot be expressed any more clearly; it is not 
a right dependent on the practice or the environment that a tortfeasor may 
encounter.272  The right to access the courts is unique and absolute, and any 
form of further reform in the area of medical malpractice will not survive 
Florida scrutiny. 273   As expressed in Mitchell, “[t]he right to access is 
specifically mentioned in Florida’s Constitution.  Therefore, it deserves more 
protection than those rights found only by implication.”274 
267. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 914 (Fla. 2014). 
268. See id.; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1287. 
269. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 174 
So. 3d 403, 409 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
270. See Graves, supra note 65, at 279. 
271. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Graves, supra note 65, at 279. 
272. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. 
273. See id.; Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 913 (Fla. 
2014). 
274. Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § 21. 
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